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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection on innova-
tion and technology transfer in a North-South quality-ladder model with innovative Northern
R&D and adaptive Southern R&D. The degree of IPR protection in two countries differs in
terms of patent breadth, which determines the markups of Northern firms and their Southern
affiliates, respectively. In this model, stronger IPR protection in the South leads to a perma-
nent decrease in the North-South wage gap, a temporary increase in the Northern innovation
rate, and a permanent increase in technology transfer. By contrast, stronger IPR protection
in the North leads to a permanent increase in the North-South wage gap, ambiguous effects
on the Northern innovation rate, and a permanent decrease in technology transfer. Finally,
we perform a quantitative analysis by calibrating the model to the US-China data, and the
numerical results support these policy implications.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in developing countries
(i.e., the South) and the incentives of developed countries (i.e., the North) to transfer technologies
has been a fundamental question in the literature on multinational firms and international trade.
This relationship has become even more important since the Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was signed by the
WTO members in 1994 to raise the level of IPR protection around the world, especially in de-
veloping countries.1 As a result of international technology transfer, some existing studies argue
that strengthening IPR protection in developing countries harms themselves by simply causing
income transfer from developing countries to developed countries (e.g., McCalman (2001) and
Park and Lippoldt (2005)), but some argue that it could benefit the global economy (e.g., Gustafs-
son and Segerstrom (2011) and Tanaka and Iwaisako (2014)). Therefore, in order to justify the
(dis)advantages of stronger IPR protection in developing countries, this study attempts to reex-
amine the effects on technology transfer within multinational firms in terms of foreign direct
investment (FDI) and on the welfare of both developing and developed countries.2
In addition, most existing studies in multinational firms and technology transfer mainly focus
on the role of stronger IPR protection in the South.3 Nevertheless, using the patent rights pro-
tection index constructed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008), Dinopoulos and Kottaridi
(2008) report that during the period 1960-2000, the degree of IPR protection increased signif-
icantly not only in developing countries (on average by 70%) but also in developed countries
(on average by 50%).4 In the North-South model setting, stronger IPR protection in the North
changes the degree of protection of their intellectual assets, as reflected by the value of patents
for innovations. This tends to alter the incentives of Northern firms to conduct research and
development (R&D) to develop new innovations and thus generates an reallocation effect on the
resources between production and R&D in the North. This resource reallocation in turn affects
the amounts of production shifted from the North to the South and the rate of technology trans-
fer accompanied with it. Accordingly, to fully consider the decision of Northern parent firms on
innovation and the decision on technology transfer to their Southern affiliates in a more realistic
environment, the (long-run) effect of stronger IPR protection in the North should also be taken
1In the current literature, the theoretical and empirical conclusions about the impacts of Southern IPR protection
on international technology transfer are mixed. For example, the North-South models by Glass and Saggi (2002) and
Glass and Wu (2007) show that stronger IPR protection in the South unambiguously reduces the rate of technology
transfer, and the empirical analysis of Mayer and Pfister (2001) and Pfister and Deffains (2005) finds a negative effect
of stronger patent rights on location decisions of French multinationals. However, the implication of North-South
models by Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), and Branstetter and Saggi (2011) is consistent with the observation in Lee and
Mansfield (1996), Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004), and Branstetter et al. (2006), such that the increase in foreign direct
investment by US multinationals results from stronger IPR protection in developing countries. See Park (2012) for a
detailed survey.
2The types of technology transfer from developed countries to developing countries can be various, such as FDI, li-
censing, and illegal imitation. In particular, inward FDI is one of the main modes that becomes increasingly important
in developing economies. FDI data from UNCTAD World Investment Report indicate that FDI inflows and inward
FDI stock in developing economies grew at an annual rate of about 11.60% and 11.81%, respectively, from 1990 to
2017.
3See, for example, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) and Iwaisako et al. (2011).
4For example, Park (2008) show that from 1960 to 2000, the Ginarte-Park index increase from 3.86 to 4.88 in the US,
from 2.85 to 4.67 in Japan, from 3.20 to 4.54 in the UK, and from 2.33 to 4.50 in Germany.
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into consideration.
To properly address the above issues, this study develops a North-South quality-ladder model
with semi-endogenous growth that features innovative R&D in the North and adaptive R&D in
the South to theoretically and quantitatively analyze the cross-country effects of IPR protection
on innovation and international technology transfer.5 Specifically, in this model, Northern firms
engage in innovative R&D to develop new higher-quality products, and to increase profit flows,
they (in the form of multinational firms) invest in adaptive R&D to transfer their manufacturing
of these products from the high-wage North to the low-wage South. Moreover, to model IPR
protection, the analysis in this study focuses on the use of the policy instrument: patent breadth,
in the North and in the South, respectively. The level of patent breadth captures the degree of
protection for the state-of-art technology holders against potential imitations, which determines
the monopolistic markups charged by multinational firms and the amount of profits generated
by the technology in the two regions. Within this open-economy dynamic general equilibrium
framework, we derive the following results.
Stronger patent protection in the South leads to a permanent decrease in the North-South
wage gap, a permanent increase in the rate of technology transfer, and a temporary increase in
the rate of Northern innovation. Intuitively, a larger patent breadth in the South raises the cost
of imitation, which generates more market power to Southern firms by allowing them to charge
a higher markup. Hence, the incentives for relocating manufacturing operations to Southern
firms through adaptive R&D increase, yielding a higher demand for R&D labor in the South.
Consequently, the wage rate in the South rises relative to the North. Furthermore, given that
stronger Southern patent protection increases the incentives for being a Southern firm, more
adaptive R&D will be performed, yielding a positive effect on the rate of international technology
transfer. As a result, a smaller number of products will be manufactured in the North. Therefore,
there is a labor reallocation from production to R&D in the North, which in turn increases the rate
of Northern innovation but only temporarily since the model has the semi-endogenous-growth
property.
Stronger patent protection in the North leads to a permanent increase in the North-South
wage gap, a permanent decrease in the rate of international technology transfer, and an am-
biguous effect on the rate of innovation in the North depending on the relative size of the two
economies.6 Intuitively, a larger patent breadth in the North increases the profit margin of North-
ern firms through a larger markup, which decreases the incentives for adaptive R&D. Hence, a
lower demand for Southern R&D labor depresses the wage rate in the South relative to the
North. Furthermore, given that a larger Northern patent breadth has a negative impact on adap-
tive R&D, the benefits of remaining as Northern firms increase, which in turn reduces the rate of
international technology transfer. Finally, as for the impact on the rate of Northern innovation,
there are two contrasting effects: a larger Northern patent breadth raises the demand for North-
ern R&D labor through a larger markup of Northern firms (i.e., the positive effect) but reduces
it through more products being manufactured in the North (i.e., the negative effect). The latter
5In Appendix B, we consider an extension in which the model with an alternative R&D specification features fully
endogenous growth in the long run. It is shown that the main results of the baseline model would be robust in this
extended model.
6Specifically, we find that strengthening Northern patent protection would cause a temporary increase (decrease)
in the rate of Northern innovation if the Southern population size is smaller (greater) than another threshold value
(i.e., α).
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negative effect on the rate of Northern innovation via R&D labor in the North becomes weaker if
the Southern labor force is smaller. Therefore, there exists a threshold on the Southern popula-
tion size below (above) which the overall effect of stronger patent protection in the North on the
innovation rate would be positive (negative).
We calibrate our model to the China-US data to quantify the cross-country effects of IPR
protection in terms of patent breadth. Our numerical analysis shows that increasing the level of
patent breadth in China by 1% (percent change) reduces the wage gap between the US and China
by 0.900% (percent change), and it raises the average quality per US worker by 0.577% (percent
change), implying a temporary higher rate of innovation in the US. The larger patent breadth in
China would increase the flow of technology transfer from the US to China by 5.225% (percent
change). Broadening patent breadth in China causes an increase in consumption of 2.141% in
China and 1.546% in the US. These welfare gains are mostly due to the increase in wages in both
countries.
Additionally, increasing the level of patent breadth in the US by 1% raises the wage gap be-
tween the US and China by 0.617% and decreases the flow of technology transfer from the US
to China by 3.993%. The larger patent breadth in the US would raise the average quality per US
worker by 3.218%, implying a temporary higher rate of innovation in the US, since the size of
China’s population is smaller than the threshold value in this case. Broadening patent breadth
in the US causes an increase in consumption of 9.431% in China and 8.792% in the US. There-
fore, broadening patent breadth in the US leads to a significantly larger welfare improvement for
the two economies in total than broadening patent breadth in China. Moreover, China tends to
benefit more than the US under a strengthening of patent protection in either country. These re-
sults highlight the importance of strengthening IPR protection in both developing and developed
countries in raising the global economy’s welfare, which, to some extent, justifies the objective of
TRIPS.
1.1 Literature review
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature on innovation and technology transfer
that models IPR protection in forms other than patent breadth. Yang and Maskus (2001) model
stronger IPR protection in terms of technology licensing and explore the impacts of reducing li-
censing costs and improvements in the licensor’s share of rents.7 Dinopoulos and Kottaridi (2008)
analyze the effects of IPR policy on innovation and technology transfer by modeling stronger IPR
protection as an increase in patent length and/or a strengthening of patent enforcement. Gancia
and Bonfiglioli (2008) study how North-South trade affects the direction of technical progress,
growth and wage differences, and they model stronger IPR protection by an exogenous fraction of
profits earned by successful Southern imitations that accrues to the original innovator. Neverthe-
less, the analysis of IPR protection in the present paper differs from the above papers by focusing
on the scope of products that grants to patented firms to produce, which is captured by the level
of patent breadth.8 Specifically, in the current quality-ladder model, patent breadth represents
the degree of quality by which the government in a region permits the state-of-art technology
7Tanaka et al. (2007) reexamine the policy analysis of the Yang and Maskus (2001) model by studying the steady
state and transitional dynamics, respectively.
8See Chapter 2 in Maskus (2000) for details about the requirement on WTO member countries to strengthen patent
protection in regard to patent breadth by the TRIPS agreement.
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holders to produce without potential imitations from competitive fringes, which determines the
markups and profits of the monopolistic firms in the North and the South, respectively. In other
words, the different levels of Northern patent breadth and Southern patent breadth captures the
difference in the market power of the two economies.
This study is closely related to the recent research of Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) and
Iwaisako et al. (2011), who analyze the effects of IPR protection in North-South quality-ladder
models,9 but there are significant differences between these studies and ours. First, in a model
with innovative R&D in the North and adaptive R&D in the South (i.e., costly FDI), Dinopoulos
and Segerstrom (2010) investigate the effects of stronger IPR protection in developing countries
on innovation, technology transfer, and welfare,10 and the form of IPR protection is represented
by the exogenous instantaneous probability that Southern affiliates’ products are copied.11 By
contrast, our study explores the same effects by employing a different IPR policy lever (i.e.,
broadening patent breadth that enlarges Southern firms’ markup). Moreover, Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (2010) show that the long-run welfare effect of stronger IPR protection in the South
on domestic consumers is theoretically ambiguous. Despite of the same analytical result in the
current study, our paper complements Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) by adding a quanti-
tative analysis to illustrate that such a welfare effect is indeed substantially positive. Second,
Iwaisako et al. (2011) explore how strengthening IPR protection in the South by increasing patent
breadth affects innovation, FDI, and welfare. Nevertheless, similar to the assumption used in
Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), and Branstetter and Saggi (2011), the setting of Iwaisako et al. (2011)
assumes that international technology transfer within multinational firms is costless, which is
inconsistent with the recent evidence that the R&D spending by affiliates of US multinationals
increased considerably.12 Our study differs from the analysis of Iwaisako et al. (2011) by consid-
ering adaptive R&D in Southern affiliates as the approach to transfer the intellectual property
that facilitates production from the North to the South. Third, this study takes into account the
effects of tightening IPR protection in the North, which conforms to the changes in patent rights
of developed countries in the last few decades. Nonetheless, the impact of Northern IPR protec-
tion is neglected in the above studies. Therefore, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study that analyzes the cross-country effects of patent breadth in a Schumpeterian growth model
with North-South technology transfer and costly FDI.
The present paper is also related to the existing studies of global patent protection. Lai
and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) analyze the welfare incentives of the Northern
and Southern governments to protect their intellectual property rights by using patent length as
the policy instrument in an open-economy variety-expanding model where both regions invest
in R&D, whereas the current paper differs from their interesting studies by focusing on the
important role of national patent policies in the form of patent breadth in an open-economy
9See Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010, 2011) and Lorenczik and Newiak (2012), who explore the effects of IPR
protection in a North-South trade model with increasing product variety.
10See Ohki (2017) for a similar analysis in a framework where both Northern and Southern firms incur technology
transfer costs.
11Glass and Saggi (2002) and Glass and Wu (2007) study the effects of stronger IPR protection on innovation and
technology transfer, with and without costly FDI, respectively, and the mode of IPR protection in their models is
similar to that in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010).
12According to The National Science Foundation, the series in International Investment and R&D Data Link reports
that the R&D expenditure of the majority-owned foreign affiliate (MOFA) of US multinational companies increased
from $25,351 millions in 2004 to $38,897 millions in 2010. See https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/rdlink/ for the details.
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quality-ladder model with international technology transfer. In addition, Chu and Peng (2011)
explore the effects of patent breadth in a two-country Schumpeterian growth model, but their
study focuses on the interaction between developed countries by considering an environment
with two Northern economies, both of which undertake innovative activities. This study, instead,
examines the impacts of the same patent tool in the presence of North-South product cycles
and international technology transfer via FDI, so our study complements the analysis of Chu
and Peng (2011) by focusing on the interaction between developed and developing economies.
Furthermore, the current study adds to the above studies by providing a quantitative analysis
on the welfare implications of patent breadth, which shows that tightening IPR protection in a
country can lead to a sizable welfare improvement in both countries.
Finally, the present paper relates to a large body of empirical studies that examine the rela-
tionship between Southern IPR protection and FDI. So far, the results in this strand of literature
appear to be very mixed. For example, Primo Braga and Fink (1998) find a negative relationship
between the degrees of IPR protection in developing countries and overseas sales by US-based
multinationals, whereas Javorcik (2004) and Branstetter et al. (2011) find that stronger patent
rights in reforming countries have a positive effect on FDI in technology-intensive industries.
Additionally, Fosfuri (2004) does not find any significant relationship between the strengths of
IPR protection and multinational investment. Thus, our North-South quality ladder model com-
plements these empirical studies by providing a theoretical rationale to support the positive effect
of IPR protection in developing countries on FDI.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 de-
rives the conditions that determine the steady-state equilibrium and the social welfare functions.
Section 4 analytically explores the cross-country effects of patent protection. Section 5 performs
a quantitative analysis. Section 6 concludes this study.
2 Model
To analyze the respective effects of Northern patent protection and Southern patent protec-
tion, we extend the Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) North-South quality-ladder model with
multinational firms, which is a recent variant of the North-South R&D-based model originating
from the seminal work by Grossman and Helpman (1991). In the model of Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (2010), a global economy consists of a high-wage North and a low-wage South, and
labor, which grows at the same rate in the two countries, is the only factor of production in
products and R&D. Firms hire Northern workers to engage in innovative R&D to produce new
higher-quality products, and such firms are called Northern quality leaders since all their produc-
tion is located in the North. To take the advantage of lower production costs in the South, a
Northern quality leader can transfer its manufacturing operations to the South within multina-
tional firms by hiring Southern workers to engage in adaptive R&D, and such a firm is called a
Southern affiliate since all its production is located in the South. Adaptive R&D is considered as a
measure of FDI because it represents the cost that multinational firms incur to transfer their tech-
nology to foreign affiliates. To introduce IPR protection, we incorporate patent breadth to protect
producers from the threat of imitations, which determines the price-marginal-cost markup in
each intermediate goods market. The level of patent breadth in the North is assumed to be
higher than the one in the South to capture the fact that IPR protection in developed countries is
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generally stronger than that in developing countries.
2.1 Households
At time t, the household in the North (South) has a population size of of LNt (L
S
t ). For
simplicity, we assume that the population growth rates in both countries are identical and equal
to gL > 0. Thus, the total population size in the world is Lt = LNt + L
S
t . Denote by α ≡
LSt /Lt the share of Southern population and 1− α the share of Northern population in the global
population, respectively.
The lifetime utility function of the representative household in country i = {N, S} is given by
U ≡
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ−gL)t ln citdt, (1)
where ρ > gL is the discount rate and cit is level of consumption per capita in country i. Each
household in country i maximizes (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
a˙it = (rt − gL)ait + wit − cit (2)
where in country i, ait is the real value of financial assets per capita, w
i
t is the real wage rate, and
rt is the real interest rate that households in both countries face at time t. Following Dinopoulos
and Segerstrom (2010), we assume that there is a global financial market such that the real interest
rates in both countries must be equal. In each country, all prices are expressed in terms of the
price of consumption goods.
Solving the standard utility maximization problem gives rise to the familiar Euler equation:
c˙Nt
cNt
=
c˙St
cSt
= rt − ρ, (3)
which implies that the growth rates of consumption in both countries are identical.
2.2 Final goods
Final goods Yt are all consumed by households and are produced by perfectly competitive
firms that aggregate a unit continuum of intermediate goods xt(j) using the standard CES ag-
gregator such that
Yt =
{∫ 1
0
[xt(j)]
σ−1
σ dj
} σ
σ−1
, (4)
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The market-clearing
condition for final goods in the world is
Yt = cNt L
N
t + c
S
t L
S
t = [(1− α)cNt + αcSt ]Lt, (5)
where cNt L
N
t and c
S
t L
S
t are the aggregate consumption in the North and South, respectively. Given
zero transportation cost, the law of one price holds such that pNc,t = et p
S
c,t, where et is the real
exchange rate and pNc,t (p
S
c,t) is the price of consumption in the North (South). In this study, all
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variables are expressed in real terms denominated by units of final good that have the same value
in the two countries. Solving this profit-maximizing problems yields the demand function for
xt(j) such that
xt(j) =
Yt
pt(j)σ
, (6)
where pt(j) is the price of xt(j).
2.3 Intermediate goods
The differentiated intermediate goods in each industry j ∈ [0, 1] are produced by a monop-
olistic quality leader who holds a patent on the latest innovation. This leader’s products will
not be replaced until a new entrant with a more advanced innovation enters the market, which
is known as the Arrow replacement effect. Among all intermediate goods, some are produced in
the North and the other in the South. If a Northern firm succeeds in inventing a state-of-the-art
good, it can register a patent for the good in both the North and the South. Products are mobile
across countries, while labor, as the only production factor of intermediate goods, is immobile.
The production function of intermediate goods by a quality leader in the North is
xt(j) = znt(j)LNx,t(j) ≡ xNt (j) (7)
where the parameter z > 1 measures the step size of a quality improvement, nt(j) is the number
of quality improvements that have occurred in industry j up to time t, and LNx,t(j) is the amount
of Northern labor employed by the quality leader for manufacturing.
In order to take advantage of cheaper labor force in the South, the quality leader in the North
also has an incentive to shift its production to the South. The shift requires adaptive R&D for
the Northern quality leader to transfer technology to its foreign affiliate. Without conducting
adaptive R&D to modify it to the local market, the production technology possessed by the
Northern quality leader can not be used by the foreign producers. Once the technology transfer
is complete, the Southern affiliate of the Northern leader can produce intermediate goods as a
monopolist according to
xt(j) = δznt(j)LSx,t(j) ≡ xSt (j) (8)
where δ > 0 is a labor-productivity parameter, capturing the productivity of Southern labor
relative to Northern labor. LSx,t(j) is the number of Southern labor employed by the foreign
affiliate for production. Notice that with the state-of-the-art technology, the condition for the
presence of FDI incentives must hold such that the marginal cost of production in the South has
to be smaller than the counterpart in the North, i.e., wSt /(δz
nt(j)) < wNt /z
nt(j).
To analyze the pricing strategy of each category of intermediate goods firms, we examine
how these firms operate in equilibrium by taking into account the responses of their potential
rivals. First, we consider the case for Northern quality leaders. On the one hand, we assume that
IPR protection in the North is incomplete. Therefore, one type of potential rivals for a current
Northern quality leader is Northern imitators who are able to gain access to the latest production
technology. On the other hand, the current Northern quality leader, as it shifts the production
to the South, can make use of cheaper labor in the South where the protection of IPR is weaker.
Thus, another type of potential rivals for a current Northern quality leader is the foreign affiliate
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of the previous Northern leader, who adopt the second-latest-generation production technology
that is one step behind the newest one. Moreover, to introduce IPR instruments that can be set by
the policymakers, we follow Goh and Olivier (2002) to assume that the strength of IPR protection
determines the imitation cost, and define by µNt > 1 the level of patent breadth in the North
controlled by Northern patent authority. Accordingly, given the productivity znt(j), Northern
imitators pay a marginal cost (i.e., µNt w
N
t /z
nt(j)) that is higher than the Northern quality leader’s
counterpart (i.e., wNt /z
nt(j)).13
Define by ωt ≡ wNt /wSt the relative wage rate. To ensure the existence of two-way product
cycles, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1. ωtδ < z/µNt .
Specifically, the assumption ωtδ < z/µNt implies w
S
t /(δz
nt(j)−1) > µNt wNt /znt(j) > wNt /znt(j),
which means that when the next innovation arrives, the manufacturing process shifts back to the
North; both the Northern quality leader and Northern imitators have a cost advantage to win
the Southern affiliate of the previous Northern leader.
Then, after the return of production to the North occurs, Assumption 1 indicates that the
strongest rival against the Northern leader is Northern imitators. Thus, similar to Iwaisako and
Futagami (2013), the breadth of Northern patent protection µNt determines the current Northern
quality leader’s markup and its maximum (optimal) price. This feature captures the insight in
Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) that "breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price". The standard
Bertrand price competition leads to the monopolistic price given by
pNt (j) =
µNt w
N
t
znt(j)
≤ σ
σ− 1
wNt
znt(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unconstrained price
, (9)
which is the limit price of the Northern leader against the Northern competitive fringes that
undertake potential imitations. The unconstrained price is referred to the case in which patent
protection in the North is complete and monopolists are able to charge the highest price deter-
mined by the intermediate goods market. Consequently, the range of Northern patent breadth is
given by 1 < µNt ≤ σ/(σ− 1).
Next, consider the case for the affiliate of the Northern leader who moves the locus of pro-
duction to the South to make use of a lower wage rate in the South. Define by µSt the level of
patent breadth in the South, controlled by Southern patent authority. In this study, we assume
that patent protection in the North is stricter than in the South such that µS < µN .14 Hence,
incomplete patent protection in the South attracts Southern imitators who also get access to the
latest-generation technology. In this case, the most competitive rival for this affiliate is Southern
imitators, since given the previously stated condition ωtδ > 1, the marginal cost of Southern
imitators is lower than that of Northern imitators (i.e., µSt w
S
t /(δz
nt(j)) < µNt w
N
t /z
nt(j)).15 Never-
13See Li (2001) for the detailed discussion on incomplete patent breadth in a quality-ladder growth model.
14According to Dinopoulos and Kottaridi (2008), the average level of patent protection in developed countries was
roughly 33% higher than the counterpart in developing countries during 1960-2000.
15In addition, Assumption 1 implies that when technology transfer is completed, the marginal cost of the Southern
affiliate of the previous leader (i.e., wSt /(δz
nt(j)−1)) is larger than that of Northern imitators’ (i.e., µNt wNt /(δznt(j))),
making Southern imitators the strongest rival against the Southern affiliate of the current leader.
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theless, the current affiliate is protected the policy of Southern patent authority because it enters
the Southern market through adaptive innovation. Accordingly, similar to the pricing strategy of
the Northern leader, the highest price set by the Southern affiliate is given by
pSt (j) =
µSt w
S
t
δznt(j)
<
σ
σ− 1
wSt
δznt(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unconstrained price
, (10)
where the range of Southern patent breadth is 1 < µSt < σ/(σ− 1).
Define the aggregate quality index across industries j ∈ [0, 1] as
Qt ≡
∫ 1
0
qt(j)dj, (11)
where qt(j) = [znt(j)]σ−1. It is also the average quality index given a unit measure of intermediate
goods industries in the global economy. The labor demands for an average-quality product
produced by a Northern leader and a Southern affiliate can be expressed, respectively, by
L¯Nx,t =
∫ 1
0
LNx,t(j)dj = QtYt
(
µNt w
N
t
)−σ
, (12)
L¯Sx,t =
∫ 1
0
LSx,t(j)dj =
QtYt
δ
(
δ
µSt w
S
t
)σ
. (13)
Using these equations, we can express the labor demands for product j as
LNx,t(j) =
qt(j)
Qt
L¯Nx,t; L
S
x,t(j) =
qt(j)
Qt
L¯Sx,t. (14)
The instantaneous profit of the Northern leader is
piNt (j) = p
N
t (j)x
N
t (j)− wNt (j)LNx,t(j) =
(
µN − 1
)
qt(j)
wNt Yt
(µNt w
N
t )
σ
, (15)
where we have applied (7), (8), (12), and (13). Furthermore, the monopoly profit of the Southern
affiliate of the Northern leader is
piSt (j) = p
S
t (j)x
S
t (j)− wSt LSx,t(j) =
(
µSt − 1
)
qt(j)
wSt Yt
δ
(
δ
µSt w
S
t
)σ
, (16)
where again (7), (8), (12), and (13) are used.16
To ensure that moving the locus of production to the South is attractive to the Northern leader
16Given the production technology znt(j) in the market, the profit flow of a new Northern quality leader in industry j
by successfully bringing the more advanced technology znt(j)+1 is zσ−1
(
µNt − 1
)
qt(j)wNt Yt/(µ
N
t w
N
t )
σ. This profit has
to exceed the Southern affiliate’s profit piSt (j) for the return of production to the North to occur, implying (δωt)/z <
Ψt, where Ψt ≡ {[(µNt − 1)(µSt )σ]/[(µSt − 1)(µNt )σ}1/(σ−1). This condition is indeed guaranteed by Assumption 1,
since Ψt ∈ (1,∞) for µSt ∈ (1, µNt ), which ensures δωt < 1/µNt < Ψt to hold.
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such that piSt (j) > pi
N
t (j), the following assumption is imposed:
Assumption 2. δωt >
[
(µNt −1)(µSt )σ
(µSt −1)(µNt )σ
] 1
σ−1
.
This assumption implies that the benefit of shifting production to the South with a lower wage
rate, after taking into account the labor productivity difference δ, must compensate for the po-
tential loss due to a lower degree of patent protection in the South.
2.4 Innovative and adaptive R&D
Innovative R&D is all performed by entrepreneurs in the North. By employing an amount
of LNr,t(j) of Northern labor to engage in innovative R&D in industry j, an R&D entrepreneur
will succeed in inventing a newer generation of product in the industry with an instantaneous
probability
λNt (j) =
Qξt L
N
r,t(j)
βqt(j)
, (17)
where the term Qξt /[βqt(j)] represents the productivity in innovative R&D. β > 0 is an exogenous
parameter. qt(j) reflects the decrease in the productivity of R&D labor as the product quality in-
creases. The consideration of decreasing R&D labor productivity (i.e., the increasing research
complexity) follows the theoretical studies such as Segerstrom (1998) and Segerstrom (2000) and
is consistent with recent empirical findings from Webb et al. (2017), which eliminates the coun-
terfactual scale effects.17 In addition, to facilitate our quantitative analysis in Section 5, Qξt is
introduced to capture the intertemporal knowledge spillover effect, and the parameter ξ ∈ [0, 1)
measures the degree of this externality.
The expected value of owning the most recent innovation in industry j is denoted by vNt (j).
The free entry into R&D implies the following zero-expected profit condition for innovative R&D:
vNt (j)λ
N
t (j) = w
N
t L
N
r,t(j)⇔ vNt (j) = βwNt qt(j)Q−ξt , (18)
where we have used (17).
Adaptive R&D in the South is performed by local entrepreneurs and the Southern affiliates
of Northern industry leaders. By employing LSr,t(j) units of Southern labor into adaptive R&D,
the Southern affiliate of a Northern leader in industry j will succeed in shifting the production
to the Southern affiliate with an instantaneous probability
λSt (j) =
Qξt L
S
r,t(j)
γqt(j)
, (19)
where Qξt /[γqt(j)] measures the labor productivity in adaptive innovation. γ > 0 is an exogenous
parameter. Similar to the process in innovative R&D, qt(j) in the denominator of (19) reflects the
increasing research complexity, and Qξt captures the intertemporal knowledge spillover effect.
Denote by vSt (j) the firm value of the Southern affiliate of a Northern leader. Thus, the expected
17See Jones (1999) for a detailed discussion on how semi-endogenous growth models remove scale effects.
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net profit for the Northern quality leader to invest in adaptive R&D is vSt (j)− vNt (j). The free-
entry condition implies the zero-expected profit for adaptive R&D, which can be expressed as[
vSt (j)− vNt (j)
]
λSt (j) = w
S
t L
S
r,t(j)⇔ vSt (j)− vNt (j) = γwSt qt(j)Qξt , (20)
where (19) is applied.
Moreover, we follow the standard treatment in this class of models to focus on a symmetric
equilibrium in which λNt (j) = λ
N
t and λ
S
t (j) = λ
S
t .
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2.5 Stock market
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for vNt (j) is
rtvNt (j) = pi
N
t (j)− wSt LSr,t(j)− λNt (j)vNt (j) + λSt (j)[vSt (j)− vNt (j)] + v˙Nt (j),
which is also the no-arbitrage condition that determines the value of vNt (j). In equilibrium, the
return on the asset vNt (j), rtv
N
t (j) on the left-hand-side (LHS), equals the sum of the terms on the
right-hand-side (RHS), including (i) the flow profits piNt (j); (ii) the expenditure for adaptive R&D
wSt L
S
r,t(j); (iii) the expected capital loss due to creative destruction λ
N
t (j)v
N
t (j); (iv) the expected
capital gain once adaptive R&D is successful λSt (j)[v
S
t (j)− vNt (j)]; (v) the potential capital gain
v˙Nt (j). Using (20), the above equation is reduced to
rtvNt (j) = pi
N
t (j)− λNt (j)vNt (j) + v˙Nt (j). (21)
Similarly, the no-arbitrage condition that determines the value of vSt (j) is given by
rtvSt (j) = pi
S
t (j)− λNt (j)vSt (j) + v˙St (j). (22)
The LHS of this equation is also the return on the asset vSt (j), and this asset return is the sum of
the terms on the RHS including (i) monopolistic profits as an affiliate piSt (j); (ii) expected capital
loss because of creative destruction λNt (j)v
S
t (j); (iii) potential capital gains v˙
S
t (j).
2.6 Decentralized equilibrium
Definition 1. The equilibrium is defined as a time path of prices, {rt, wNt , wSt , pNt (j), pSt (j), vNt , vSt }∞t=0,
a time path of allocations, {cNt , cSt , Yt, xNt (j), xSt (j), LNx,t(j), LSx,t(j), LNr,t(j), LSr,t(j)}∞t=0, for j ∈ [0, 1], and a
time path of patent policies {µNt , µSt }∞t=0.
Moreover, at each instance of time,
• the representative household in the North maximizes lifetime utility taking {rt, Pt, wNt } as
given;
• the representative household in the South maximizes lifetime utility taking {rt, Pt, wSt } as
given;
18Cozzi et al. (2007) provide a theoretical justification for the symmetric equilibrium in this strand of Schumpeterian
growth model. See Chu et al. (2018) for the same treatment in a monetary Schumpeterian growth model with North-
South technology transfer.
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• competitive final goods firms produce Yt to maximize profits taking {pNt (j), pSt (j)} as given;
• Northern quality leaders choose pNt (j) and produce xNt (j) to maximize profits taking wNt as
given;
• Southern affiliates choose pSt (j) and produce xSt (j) to maximize profits taking wSt as given;
• entrepreneurs in the North employ LNr,t(j) to perform innovative R&D taking {rt, wNt , vNt }
as given;
• Southern affiliates of Northern quality leaders employ LSr,t(j) to perform adaptive R&D
taking {rt, wSt , vSt } as given;
• the final goods market clears such that Yt = cNt LNt + cSt LSt ;
• the labor market clearing conditions hold in both countries; and
• the nominal exchange rate is determined by the law of one price such that et = pNc,t/pSc,t.
3 Steady-state equilibrium
In this section, we solve the steady-state equilibrium and analyze how a stationary time
path of Southern and Northern patent policy (i.e., {µS, µN}) affects innovation in the North and
international technology transfer, respectively. To do so, we first derive the steady-state number
of each type of industries and the expression of quality index. Then, we specify the steady-state
labor market conditions in the two countries, and by combining these conditions we construct the
Southern and Northern steady-state conditions of technology transfer and innovation. Finally,
we derive the steady-state welfare in both countries.
3.1 Industry composition and quality dynamics
There are two types of industries in the intermediate goods sector, the Northern quality
leaders and the Southern affiliates. Denote θN and θS as the steady-state measure of these two
types of industries, respectively. Then, these measures of all industries must add up to one such
that
θN + θS = 1. (23)
Each industry can switch randomly across these two categories with probabilities that in turn
depends on the Poisson arrival rates of innovative and adaptive R&D. In the steady state, the
measure of industries in each type must be constant such that the flow in and out of the Southern
affiliate must be equal. This relation can be established as the following equation
θNλS︸ ︷︷ ︸
flow into affiliates
= θSλN︸ ︷︷ ︸
flow out of affiliates
. (24)
It is straightforward that this equation can be also stated as the flow out and into the Northern
quality leaders. Solving (23) and (24) yields the measure of these industries such that
θN =
λN
λN + λS
, (25)
θS =
λS
λN + λS
. (26)
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By definition, the aggregate quality index across industries j ∈ [0, 1] is
Qt ≡
∫ 1
0
qt(j)dj =
∫ 1
0
κnt(j)dj, (27)
where κ ≡ zσ−1 > 1 is a composite parameter that is increasing in the quality step size z. This
quality index can be further decomposed into the following two components:
Qt = QNt + Q
S
t =
∫
θN
qt(j)dj +
∫
θS
qt(j)dj. (28)
The following lemma provides the steady-state expression for the measure of each component of
aggregate quality.
Lemma 1. In the steady state, the two components of aggregate quality can be expressed as
QNt
Qt
=
κλN
κλN + λS
, (29)
QSt
Qt
=
λS
κλN + λS
. (30)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
3.2 Northern labor market
The labor market clearing condition in the North is given by
LNt = L
N
x,t + L
N
r,t =
∫
θN
LNx,t(j)dj +
∫ 1
0
LNr,t(j)dj. (31)
The amount of labor employed for production by Northern quality leaders is
LNx,t =
∫
θN
qt(j)
Qt
L¯Nx,tdj =
QNt
Qt
L¯Nx,t, (32)
where the first equality uses (14). Using (17), the amount of labor employed for innovative R&D
is
LNr,t = βλ
NQ1−ξt , (33)
where the symmetry condition λN(j) = λN is imposed. Substituting (32) and (33) into (31),
together with (29), yields the Northern labor market clearing condition in per capita terms such
that
1 =
L¯Nx,t
LNt
κλN
κλN + λS
+ βλNΦ, (34)
where Φt ≡ Q1−ξt /LNt = Φ is defined as the average quality per Northern worker, which is
constant over time in any steady-state equilibrium.
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3.3 Southern labor market
The labor market clearing condition in the South is given by
LSt = L
S
x,t + L
S
r,t =
∫
θS
LSx,t(j)dj +
∫
θN
LSr,t(j)dj. (35)
The amount of labor employed for production by Southern affiliates is
LSx,t =
∫
θS
qt(j)
Qt
L¯Sx,tdj =
QSt
Qt
L¯Sx,t, (36)
where the first equality uses (14). Using (19) and imposing the symmetry condition λSt (j) = λ
S,
the amount of labor employed for adaptive R&D is given by
LSr,t = γλ
SQ1−ξt
QNt
Qt
. (37)
Substituting (36) and (37) into (35), coupled with (29) and (30), we express the Southern labor
market clearing condition in per capita terms such that
1 =
λS
κλN + λS
[
L¯Sx,t
LSt
+
γκλN(1− α)
α
Φ
]
, (38)
where LNt /L
S
t = (1− α)/α is used.
3.4 Innovation and technology transfer
Differentiating (27) with respect to time t yields the growth rate of the quality index
Q˙t =
∫ 1
0
[
κnt(j)+1 − κnt(j)
]
λNt dj = (κ − 1)λNt Qt. (39)
Taking the log of Φt = Q
1−ξ
t /L
N
t and differentiating it with respect to time yields
Φ˙t
Φt
= (1− ξ) Q˙t
Qt
− L˙
N
t
LNt
= (1− ξ)(κ − 1)λNt − gL. (40)
Since Φt is stationary in the steady state, (40) implies that the steady-state arrival rate of innova-
tion is completely determined by the exogeneous population growth rate given by
λN =
gL
(1− ξ)(κ − 1) . (41)
This feature originates from the insight that the increasing research complexity acts as a counter-
active force to growing R&D inputs. As discussed in Segerstrom (2000) and Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (2010), any increase in R&D inputs leading to a higher product quality makes product
more complex and harder for researchers to find further improvements. As a consequence, a
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growing R&D labor employment is required to maintain a constant innovation rate over time. In
the model, R&D labor is only determined by the exogenous population growth rate, which leads
the steady-state arrival rate of innovation to be exogenously pinned down.
Furthermore, in the steady state, from (21) and (22), the values of assets for the Northern
quality leader and the Southern affiliate can be expressed as
vNt (j) =
piNt (j)
ρ+ λN
, (42)
and
vSt (j) =
piSt (j)
ρ+ λN
. (43)
Substituting (15) and (42) into (18) yields the following steady-state innovative R&D condition:
(
µN − 1
) L¯Nx,t
Q1−ξt
= β(ρ+ λN). (44)
Similarly, substituting (15), (16), (42), and (43) into (20) gives rise to the following steady-state
adaptive R&D condition:
(
µS − 1
) L¯Sx,t
Q1−ξt
−ω
(
µN − 1
) L¯Nx,t
Q1−ξt
= γ(ρ+ λN), (45)
where ω = wNt /w
S
t is the steady-state relative wage, which will be shown to be a function of the
patent instruments {µN , µS} in the next section.
Next, substituting (44) into (34) yields the Northern steady-state condition such that
1 = βλNΦ
{
κ(ρ+ λN)
(µN − 1)(κλN + λS) + 1
}
, (46)
which contains two endogenous variables {Φ,λS} and features a positive slope and a positive
Φ-intercept in the {Φ,λS} space as shown in Figure 1, where "North" represents the Northern
steady-state condition. The intuition behind the positive slope of the Northern steady-state con-
dition can be explained as follows. At each instant of time, an increase in λS implies that more
products are manufactured in the South but less in the North, which in turn leads to a reallo-
cation of labor in the North from production to innovative R&D due to the resource constraint
on Northern labor. Thus, the increase in Northern R&D labor raises the average quality per
Northern worker (i.e., Φ) in the steady state.
Then, substituting (44) into (38), together with (45), yields the Southern steady-state condition
such that
1 =
ΦλS(1− α)
α(κλN + λS)
{
(ρ+ λN)
[
γ+ βω
(
µN , µS
)]
µS − 1 + γκλ
N
}
, (47)
where the relation LNt /L
S
t = (1− α)/α is used. This condition also contains two endogenous
variables {Φ,λS} but features a negative slope, with no intercepts, in the {Φ,λS} space in Figure
16
λS
Φ
North
South
µN ↑µ
S ↑
µN ↑
O
Figure 1: The steady-state equilibrium.
1, where "South" represents the Southern steady-state condition. Intuitively, at each instant of
time, an increase in λS implies that more products are manufactured in the South, which in turn
reallocates labor in the South from adaptive R&D to production due to the resource constraint
on Southern labor. Therefore, according to (37) that shows the level of adaptive R&D labor (i.e.,
LSr = γκLNt Φλ
NλS/(κλN + λS)), a higher λS can be consistent with a smaller LSr only when the
difficulty level Φ = Q1−ξ/LN decreases sufficiently (i.e., technologies become sufficiently easy to
be transferred to the South). Summing up, (46) and (47) are the two conditions that implicitly
solve for the steady-state values of {Φ,λS}. The intersection at point O in Figure 1 determines
the unique steady-state values for Φ and λS.
3.5 Social welfare
In this section, we derive the steady-state social welfare in each country.19 Imposing balanced
growth on (1) yields the steady-state welfare of the Northern household given by
UN =
1
ρ− gL
(
ln cN0 +
g
ρ− gL
)
, (48)
where g = gL/[(1− ξ)(σ − 1)] is the growth rate of consumption (as well as final goods) per
capita, which depends on exogenous parameters due to the semi-endogenous growth property.
Therefore, the steady-state level of welfare is determined by the balanced-growth level of con-
sumption. According to (2), using balanced growth condition a˙Nt /a
N
t = g yields
cNt = (ρ− gL) aNt + wNt . (49)
The balanced-growth level of consumption cN0 is thus a sum of asset income (ρ− gL)aN0 and wage
income wN0 . Similar conditions also apply to the Southern case. To explicitly derive a
N
0 and a
S
0 ,
we follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to assume that the asset from innovative R&D in
19A more complete welfare analysis should take into account the dynamic transition of the household’s utility from
the initial steady state to the final one. However, such an analysis is much more challenging both analytically and
numerically in this class of models. Therefore, the welfare analysis in this study follows the usual treatment in the
literature to focus on steady-state welfare. See, for example, Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) and Chu et al. (2018).
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the North is owned by the Northern household whereas the asset from adaptive R&D in the
South is owned by the Southern household. Under this assumption, we show in Lemma 2 that
the balanced-growth levels of consumption
{
cN0 , c
S
0
}
can be expressed as a function of
{
wN0 , w
S
0
}
,
as similar to Chu et al. (2018).
Lemma 2. The balanced-growth level of consumption can be expressed as
cN0 = β(ρ− gL)ΦwN0︸ ︷︷ ︸
asset income
+ wN0︸︷︷︸
wage income
= wN0 I
N , (50)
cS0 = (ρ− gL)(γ+ βω)
κλNΦ(1− α)
α(κλN + λS)
wS0︸ ︷︷ ︸
asset income
+ wS0︸︷︷︸
wage income
= wS0 I
S, (51)
wS0 =
(
ΦLN0
) 1
(1−ξ)(σ−1)

(
µNω
)1−σ κλN
κλN + λS︸ ︷︷ ︸
quality leaders
+
(
µS
δ
)1−σ
λS
κλN + λS︸ ︷︷ ︸
affiliates

1
σ−1
, (52)
where {IN , IS} denote the consumption-wage ratio for the North and South.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Due to the complexity of the analytical welfare analysis, we perform a quantitative analysis
to examine the effects of both Southern and Northern IPR protection on steady-state welfare in
Section 5.
4 Patent policy, innovation, and technology transfer
In this section, we explore the effects of Southern and Northern patent policy {µS, µN} on the
innovation rate λN and the technology transfer rate λS, respectively. Before doing so, we examine
the effects of these patent-policy tools on the relative wage ω. From (12) and (13), we obtain
L¯Sx,t
Qt
=
1
δ
(
δµNω
µS
)σ L¯Nx,t
Qt
. (53)
Dividing (44) by (45) and making use of (53) yield the following steady-state relative-wage condition:
γ
βωσ
+ω1−σ = δσ−1
(
µN
µS
)σ
µS − 1
µN − 1, (54)
which is an implicit function that pins down the steady-state equilibrium value of the relative
wage ω(µN , µS). The following proposition shows the effects of patent policy in each country on
the relative wage.
Proposition 1. Strengthening patent protection in the South lowers the relative wage rate between the
North and the South, whereas strengthening patent protection in the North raises the relative wage rate.
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Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 1 can be explained as follows. As shown in (16), strengthening Southern patent
protection grants a larger market power to Southern affiliates by allowing them to charge a higher
markup. Given the wage rates, this raises the benefits of being Southern affiliates, which increases
the incentives for adaptive innovation. Thus, the value of Southern firms vSt (j) as indicated in
(43) (relative to the value of Northern firms as indicated in (42)) tends to rise. Then, the zero-
profit condition for adaptive R&D in (20) implies that the increase in the reward for adaptive
R&D must correspondingly cause an increase in the R&D cost. This yields a positive effect on
the demand for Southern R&D labor. Consequently, strengthening Southern patent protection
raises the wage rate in the South relative to the North.
By contrast, given the wage rates, strengthening Northern patent protection raises the benefits
of remaining as a Northern quality leader through a higher markup. This decreases the incentives
for adaptive R&D, and the firm value vSt (j) as shown in (43) (relative to the value of Northern
firms as shown in (42)) tends to decline. According to the zero-profit condition for adaptive
R&D in (20), a decrease in the reward for adaptive R&D corresponds to a decrease in the R&D
cost, yielding a negative effect on the demand for Southern R&D labor. Therefore, strengthening
Northern patent protection reduces the wage rate in the South relative to the North.
Having established the effects of Southern and Northern patent policy {µS, µN} on the relative
wage rate ω, we are now in position to explore their effects on the rate of innovation λN and
of international technology transfer λS. First, the following proposition illustrates the results
regarding the impacts of an increase in µS on λN and λS.
Proposition 2. Strengthening patent protection in the South yields (i) a temporary higher rate of innova-
tion in the North, and (ii) a positive effect on the technology transfer from the North to the South.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Proposition 2 can be explained as follows. Graphically, a higher µS shifts the South curve to
the right in Figure 1, whereas this shift does not affect the North curve, leading to a rise in both
Φ and λS. Intuitively, a rise in µS increases the profit margin of the Southern affiliate in (16).
This makes it more attractive for firms to engage in adaptive R&D in the South by changing the
relative asset values. To see this, combining (18) and (20), and substituting (54) into the resulting
equation yield
vSt (j)
vNt (j)
=
piSt (j)
piNt (j)
=
(
γ
β
)
1
ω(µN , µS)
+ 1, (55)
where (42) and (43) are used in the first equality and (15), (16), and (54) are used in the second
equality. Recall that a higher µS decreases the relative wage rate ω; therefore, it also increases
vSt (j)/v
N
t (j). In this case, more adaptive R&D will be performed, so a higher µ
S yields a positive
effect on the rate of international technology transfer λS. Moreover, the higher rate of technology
transfer to the South implies a smaller number of products being manufactured in the North.
The lower demand for Northern production labor causes a reallocation of labor in the North
from manufacturing to innovative R&D. As a consequence, the rate of Northern innovation λN
increases in the short run, which is associated with a higher average quality per Northern worker
Φ in the long run, as implied by (40).
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Next, the following proposition illustrates the results regarding the impacts of an increase in
µN on λN and λS.
Proposition 3. Strengthening patent protection in the North yields (i) a temporary higher (lower) rate of
innovation in the North if the Southern population size is sufficiently small (large), and (ii) a lower rate of
technology transfer from the North to the South.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Proposition 3 can be explained as follows. Figure 1 shows that a higher µN shifts the North
curve to the right whereas it shifts the South curve to the left, resulting in an unambiguously
decreasing effect on λS and an ambiguous effect on Φ.20 Intuitively, as for the impact on λS,
a higher µN increases the profit margin of the Northern quality leaders through allowing for a
higher markup in (15). This increases the innovative R&D firm value relative to the adaptive
R&D firm value (i.e., vSt (j)/v
N
t (j) declines), as explained in Proposition 2.
21 In other words,
conducting adaptive R&D becomes less attractive. Thus, less international technology transfer
occurs (i.e., a lower λS) under a stronger degree of Northern patent protection (i.e., a higher µN).
As for the effect on Φ, one can see from (15) that, a strengthened Northern patent protection
µN causes two contrasting effects as follows. On the one hand, as aforementioned, a larger
µN increases the profit margin of Northern quality leaders, which increases the incentives for
innovative R&D. This tends to reallocate labor from production to R&D in the North. On the
other hand, a larger µN decreases the technology transfer rate λS (according to Proposition 3 (ii)),
which implies that more products will be manufactured in the North. This tends to reallocate
labor from R&D to production in the North. Accordingly, whether a larger Northern patent
breadth µN increases the average quality per Northern worker Φ in the long run depends on
the interplay between the positive effect of µN on Northern R&D labor through markup and the
negative effect through product manufacturing.
We find that this interplay is determined by the Southern population size α. To see this, we
use λSt (j) = λ
S
t and (37) to derive
λSt =
LSr,t
γQNt
=
1
γΦ
LSr,t
(1− α)Lt
Qt
QNt
, (56)
where the second equality uses Φ = Qt/LNt and L
N
t = (1− α)Lt. In the steady state, QNt /Qt is
given by (29), and hence, (56) can be reexpressed as
Φ =
1
γ
κλN + λS(µN)
κλNλS(µN)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
LSr,t
(1− α)Lt︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
, (57)
where A is decreasing in λS. Consider that λS is a function of µN in the steady-state equilibrium.
In this case, A captures the positive effect of µN on Φ by increasing the Northern quality leaders’
20Precisely, if an increase in µN shifts the North curve to the right in a larger (smaller) magnitude than the South
curve to the left, then an increase (decrease) in Φ emerges in response.
21Similarly, combining (18) and (20) yields vSt (j)/v
N
t (j) = (γ/β)/ω(µ
N , µS) + 1, which shows that vSt (j)/v
N
t (j) is
decreasing in µN .
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profit margin, given that an increase in µN decreases λS and increases A and Φ. Nevertheless,
B captures the negative effect of µN on Φ by increasing the Northern labor demand in product
manufacturing, given that an increase in µN decreases LSr,t, and thus B and Φ.
Therefore, one can see that, when the size of Southern population α is sufficiently small, the
decrease in the number of products manufactured by Southern affiliates is not significant, imply-
ing a small increase in the Northern manufacturing operations. Hence, the negative effect B via
products manufacturing becomes relatively weak to be dominated by the positive effect A via
markup, causing a reallocation of labor in the North from manufacturing to innovative R&D. As
a result, the rate of Northern innovation λN increases in the short run, and the average quality
per Northern worker Φ increases in the long run, as implied by (40). By contrast, if the size of
Southern population α is sufficiently large, the decrease in the number of products manufactured
by Southern affiliates is significant. In this case of a large increase in the Northern manufactur-
ing operations, the negative effect B through product manufacturing becomes relatively strong
to dominate the positive effect A through markup. Consequently, the resulting mechanism re-
verses; the rate of Northern innovation λN decreases in the short run, and the average quality
per Northern worker Φ decreases in the long run.
5 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate our model to numerically evaluate the effects of the Northern and
Southern patent instruments, respectively. Specifically, we consider China as the South and the
US as the North to explore the welfare implications of patent protection in each country. To do so,
we first describe the calibration strategy in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 then provides the benchmark
quantitative results, and Section 5.3 shows the results of robustness checks by altering the values
of some parameters and empirical moments.
5.1 Calibration
To perform this numerical analysis, the strategy is to assign steady-state values to the follow-
ing structural parameters {ρ, σ, α, µN , µS, δ, κ, β,γ, z, ξ}. We follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012)
to choose a value of 0.05 for the discount rate ρ. We follow Acemoglu et al. (2018) to capture the
empirical estimates of Broda and Weinstein (2006) who show that the elasticity of substitution σ
is roughly 2.9. Using the data from the World Development Indicators on the labor force size of
the US and China, the parameter α is set to 0.829 to correspond to the relative population size.22
As for the market-level values of the Northern patent instrument µN and the Southern instru-
ment µS, we choose µN = 1.3 according to the estimates of average markup ratio for the US in
Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012)23 and µS = 1.25 according to the estimates for China in Lu
and Yu (2015).24 As for the North-South relative wage rate ω, it is about 20.101 from 2002 to 2013
according to the data from the Conference Board on manufacturing hourly compensation costs
22The data is available at http://wdi.worldbank.org/tables, Table 2.2, Labor Force Structure.
23See also Norrbin (1993) who reports a similar estimate.
24Using the data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Production (ASIP), Lu and Yu (2015) show that the average
markup of most Chinese two-digit manufacturing industries is approximately between 1 and 1.3, and we choose a
value of 1.25 within this range.
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between the US and China.25 Then, we choose a value of δ = 0.0625 to ensure that Assumptions
1 and 2 are satisfied given the parameter values chosen above.
As for κ, γ, and β, given that it is the relative R&D productivity γ/β (rather than their
individual values) that determines the values of variables in equilibrium, we then only need to
calibrate κ and γ/β by using (i) the population growth rate; (ii) the innovation arrival rate; and
(iii) the relative R&D intensity for both the US and China.26 For gL, we follow Jones and Williams
(2000) to set it to 1.44% to correspond to the long-run growth rate of the US labor force. For λN ,
we select an empirically plausible value of 5% and explore the other values in the robustness
analysis.27 For the relative R&D intensity, according to the OECD database, the gross domestic
spending on R&D for the US and China is about 2.596% and 1.226% of their respective GDP.28
Based on this relative R&D intensity indicator, we construct the corresponding expression such
that [wN0 L
N
r0/(w
N
0 L
N
r0 + c
N
0 L
N
0 )]/[w
S
0 L
S
r0/(w
S
0 L
S
r0 + c
S
0 L
S
0)] = 2.117.
29 Together with equations (46),
(47) and (54), {κ,γ/β} and the equilibrium values of {Φ,λS} are simultaneously solved. Given
the calibrated value of κ, equation (41) pins down the externality of intertemporal knowledge
spillover ξ, and the definition of κ = zσ−1 determines the value of quality step size z. All above
calibrated values are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
ρ σ α µN µS δ κ γ/β z ξ
0.05 2.9 0.829 1.3 1.25 0.0625 2.609 8.854 1.656 0.821
5.2 Benchmark estimation results
Given the benchmark calibrated parameter values, we now conduct the following experiments
by enhancing patent protection in China and the US, respectively. We start off by exploring the
situations in China. As reported in Table 2, we find that the average quality per Northern worker
Φ increases by 0.577% (percent change) in response to a permanent 1% (percent change) rise in
the level of patent breadth µS in China, implying a temporary higher rate of innovation λN in
the North according to (40). Moreover, the international technology transfer rate λS increases
correspondingly by 5.225% (percent change). When expressing the welfare changes as the usual
equivalent variation in consumption, we find that a stricter patent policy in China leads to a
welfare gain of 2.141% in China. From Lemma 2, we know that the change in cS0 comes from the
25The data is included in International Compensations of Hourly Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2016 -
China and India, Table 4.
26It is the value of βΦ, which is independent of β, that affects equilibrium variables in the model. Therefore, we
normalize β to unity for simplicity only when reporting the value of Φ.
27Studies in the literature have considered different values for the arrival rate of innovations. For instance, Caballero
and Jaffe (2002) and Laitner and Stolyarov (2013) estimate the mean rate of creative destruction to be roughly 3.5%,
while Lanjouw (1998) shows that the probability of obsolescence ranges from 7% to 12%. Thus, we consider an
intermediate value of 5% within this range.
28The indicator for China is available during the period of 1991-2016. Both indicators for the US and China are
available in https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm.
29The subscript of time 0 indicates that the economy is on the initial balanced-growth path before being intervened
by changes in patent policy.
22
changes in wS0 and I
S. The numerical results show that as µS rises by one percent, wS0 increases
by 2.396%, whereas cS0 increases by 2.141%. This means that I
S decreases marginally by 0.255%,
which implies a decline in the household’s asset-wage income ratio. Finally, although the rise in
µS narrows the wage gap ω by 0.900% (percent change), it still raises the wage rate in the US ωN0
by 1.492%.30 The increase in ωN0 in turn causes a welfare gain of 1.546% in the US, but the size is
smaller than that in China.
Table 2: Benchmark simulation
Φ λS ω ∆ lnωN0 ∆ lnω
S
0 ∆ ln c
N
0 ∆ ln c
S
0
2.940 0.0194 20.101 - - - -
∆µS 2.957 0.0204 19.920 1.492% 2.396% 1.546% 2.141%
∆µN 3.034 0.0186 20.225 8.488% 7.873% 8.792% 9.431%
Furthermore, Table 2 displays that a permanent 1% (percent change) increase in the level of
patent breadth µN in US raises the average quality per Northern worker Φ by 3.218% (percent
change), as the result of the Southern population size α being relatively small as shown in Propo-
sition 3,31 despite of a large number of population in China. In this case, the positive effect of
a larger µN through price markup outweighs the negative effect via products manufacturing,
raising the incentives for Northern innovation. Correspondingly, Φ rises permanently and the
innovation rate λN in the North rises temporarily. In addition, the technology transfer rate λF
from the US to China decreases by 3.993% (percent change); it is caused in part by a decrease
in adaptive R&D because of a lower level of Southern R&D labor, and an reinforcing effect from
the increase in Φ also makes the technology transfer more difficult. Moreover, the US-China
wage gap ω enlarges by 0.617% (percent change), and the wage rates in both countries increase
significantly (i.e., 8.488% in the US and 7.873% in China) in response to a larger µN . Accordingly,
a strengthening of patent protection in the US yields a welfare gain of 8.792% in the US and
9.341% in China, respectively. In contrast to the changes caused by a larger µS in China, more
welfare gains in the two countries are achieved by a stronger patent policy in the US, because of
the substantial increases in the wage rates of both countries. Interestingly, in the above policy
experiments, China benefits more than the US from a strengthening of patent protection in either
country.
5.3 Robustness check
We now perform two robustness checks on our numerical exercise to illustrate how the quan-
titative results will vary under different assumptions. Specifically, we first consider alternative
values of the innovation-arrival rate and then of the relative R&D intensity.
30According to International Labour Organization Global Wage Report 2018/19, the increase in the real average
wages of emerging G20 economies (by triple) is more significant than the counterpart of advanced G20 economies (by
9%) during 1999-2017.
31According to (A.12), the threshold value α in this numerical analysis is 0.996.
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5.3.1 Innovation-arrival rate
Given the various estimates of the US innovation-arrival rate in the existing literature, such
as Lanjouw (1998) and Caballero and Jaffe (2002), in this subsection we consider two alternative
values of the innovation-arrival rate λN ∈ {0.1, 0.15}. Having other parameter values remain
unchanged as in the benchmark, we perform the same policy experiment by raising µS and µN
by 1%, respectively. Based on the numerical results as displayed in Table 3, it can be seen that
a higher long-run innovation arrival rate λN tends to mitigate the effects of both the Southern
patent instrument µS and the Northern patent instrument µN on all economic variables, except
the relative wage. For example, in the case of λN = 0.1, raising the degree of IPR in China causes a
smaller increase in the average quality per US worker Φ (i.e., 0.544%) and the rate of international
technology transfer λF (i.e., 5.095%), as compared to the benchmark case (i.e., 0.577% and 5.225%,
respectively). Similar patterns of the results are found when raising the degree of IPR in the US,
that is, a rise of 3.072% in the average quality per US worker Φ and a decline of 3.834% in the
international technology transfer rate λF, as compared to 3.218% and 3.993%, respectively, in
the benchmark. As for the welfare effects, a strengthened IPR protection in either country leads
to less welfare gains in contrast to the benchmark. However, despite of these small changes in
the magnitudes of each economic variable, the overall pattern of the cross-country effects of IPR
policy is consistent with the benchmark case. In other words, strengthening IPR in one country
yields larger welfare improvements in China than in the US.
Table 3: Simulation under λN ∈ {0.1, 0.15}
∆Φ ∆λS ∆ω ∆ lnωN0 ∆ lnω
S
0 ∆ ln c
N
0 ∆ ln c
S
0
λN = 0.1
∆µS 0.544% 5.095% -0.899% 1.389% 2.293% 1.423% 2.101%
∆µN 3.072% -3.834% 0.617% 8.079% 7.364% 8.271% 8.497%
λN = 0.15
∆µS 0.529% 5.032% -0.899% 1.341% 2.245% 1.365% 2.091%
∆µN 3.000% -3.759% 0.617% 7.889% 7.274% 8.029% 8.072%
5.3.2 R&D intensity
To conduct this robustness check, we consider two scenarios. First, as argued in Comin (2004)
and Jones (2016), the data on R&D expenditure reported by US firms are likely to underestimate
the resources devoted into innovation-related activities.32 Thus, we use the data from the most
recent Science and Engineering Indicators 2018,33 to consider a higher measure for the US R&D
intensity in 2015 at the value of 3.9%. With the R&D intensity in China unchanged, we reexamine
the quantitative results under a larger US-China relative R&D intensity, which is 3.181 now.
Then, preserving the other parameter values as in the benchmark, we report in Table 4 the re-
calibrated values and the new quantitative results.34 Given that the relative productivity of the
32See Jones (2016) for a detailed discussion.
33See details in https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/report, Table 4-10.
34The value of δ is adjusted to ensure that both Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
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Southern manufacturing labor to the Northern one becomes lower (i.e., a lower δ) and the relative
productivity of adaptive R&D to innovative R&D becomes higher (i.e., a lower γ/β), increasing
Southern patent breadth µS by 1% yields a larger increase in the average quality per US worker
Φ (i.e., 0.701% versus 0.577% in the benchmark) and in international technology transfer λF (i.e.,
5.531% versus 5.225% in the benchmark). In contrast, increasing Northern patent breadth µN by
1% leads to a smaller increase in Φ (i.e., 3.126% versus 3.218% in the benchmark) and a larger
decrease in λF (i.e., −4.082% versus −3.993% in the benchmark). As compared to the benchmark
case, a smaller size in the wage increase and the welfare gain is observed when enhancing IPR in
both countries. Nevertheless, again, the overall pattern of the cross-country effects of IPR policy
still holds as in the benchmark estimation.
Table 4: Simulation under a larger relative R&D intensity.
δ κ γ/β z ξ Φ λS ω
0.0585 2.298 5.434 1.549 0.778 2.998 0.0202 20.101
∆Φ ∆λS ∆ω ∆ lnωN0 ∆ lnω
S
0 ∆ ln c
N
0 ∆ ln c
S
0
∆µS 0.701% 5.531% -0.940% 1.416% 2.320% 1.483% 2.051%
∆µN 3.126% -4.082% 0.644% 6.515% 4.496% 6.816% 7.247%
Second, when considering the fact that the R&D expenditure share of GDP in China has
increased sharply from 0.639% in 1997 to 2.108% in 2016 whereas the US counterpart remains
roughly constant according to OECD data, it is reasonable to redo the numerical exercise under
a lower US-China relative R&D intensity. Thus, we consider an alternative case by using the data
for the period 1997-2016 during which the relative R&D intensity between the US and China is
1.886. The re-calibrated parameters and equilibrium variables under this value of relative R&D
intensity are reported in Table 5.35 Differing from the case under a larger relative R&D intensity,
a higher value of δ and of γ/β causes a tightening of Southern patent protection µS by 1% to
yield a smaller increase in the average quality per US worker Φ (i.e., 0.526% versus 0.577% in the
benchmark) and in the international technology transfer rate λF (i.e., 5.090% versus 5.225% in the
benchmark). Additionally, this set of parameter values causes a tightening of Northern patent
policy µN by 1% to yield a larger increase in Φ (i.e., 3.256% versus 3.218% in the benchmark)
and a smaller decrease in λF (i.e., −3.959% versus −3.993% in the benchmark). Finally, although
the welfare effects of strengthening IPR protection in this case become larger, China continues to
benefit more than the US from the policy change in either country.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we analyze the cross-country effects of IPR protection on innovation and tech-
nology transfer in an open-economy Schumpeterian growth model with North-South product
cycles. The IPR regime takes patent breadth as the policy instrument in both countries to capture
the impacts of market power on the R&D incentives of Northern and Southern firms. We find
that broadening patent breadth in the South leads to a permanent decrease in the North-South
35Again, the value of δ is adjusted to guarantee that both Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
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Table 5: Simulation under a smaller relative R&D intensity.
δ κ γ/β z ξ Φ λS ω
0.0644 2.685 10.639 1.682 0.829 2.916 0.0185 20.101
∆Φ ∆λS ∆ω ∆ lnωN0 ∆ lnω
S
0 ∆ ln c
N
0 ∆ ln c
S
0
∆µS 0.526% 5.090% -0.886% 1.437% 2.327% 1.487% 2.082%
∆µN 3.256% -3.959% 0.607% 9.024% 8.419% 9.330% 9.934%
wage gap, a temporary increase in the Northern innovation rate, and a permanent increase in
technology transfer. Nevertheless, broadening patent breadth in the North leads to a permanent
increase in the North-South wage gap, ambiguous effects on the Northern innovation rate, and a
permanent decrease in technology transfer. In particular, the size of Southern population plays a
critical role in disambiguating the effect of Northern patent protection on innovation. By calibrat-
ing the model to the China-US data, our numerical analysis shows that the effect of tightening
patent protection in either country is significantly welfare-improving, but the policy change in
the US generates larger effects on the global economy than that in China. Furthermore, China
receives more welfare gains than the US when IPR protection in one country is strengthened.
Therefore, this study presents an example in the welfare analysis that sheds some light on the
justification for (both developed and developing) countries to make the upgrading of their IPR,
following the agreement on TRIPS.
There are two potential dimensions to extend the present paper. First, the current model is
based on an open-economy version of the quality-ladder model to explore the effects of patent
breadth on innovation and international technology transfer. To characterize the important prop-
erties of the innovation structure, these effects could be reexamined in an open-economy version
of the variety-expanding model as in Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011). Moreover, the effects of
patent breadth could be investigated in a framework with different modes of international tech-
nology transfer that abstract from FDI, such as licensing in Yang and Maskus (2001) and Tanaka
et al. (2007) and imitation in Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) and Lorenczik and Newiak (2012).
These crucial issues can represent interesting directions for future research.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to provide the proof. The dynamics of the
quality index for QNt and Q
S
t are given by respectively
Q˙Nt =
∫
θN
[
κnt(j)+1 − κnt(j)
]
λNt dj +
∫
θS
κnt(j)+1λNt dj−
∫
θN
κnt(j)λSt dj
= (κ − 1)λNt QNt + κλNt QSt − λSt QSt ,
(A.1)
and
Q˙St =
∫
θN
κnt(j)λSt dj−
∫
θS
κnt(j)λNt dj = λ
S
t Q
N
t − λNt QSt . (A.2)
Since the industry composition is stationary over time in the steady state, the growth rate of
average quality in the North and the counterpart in the South must be equal to each other and
they are constant over time. Therefore,
Q˙Nt
QNt
=
Q˙St
QSt
. (A.3)
Substituting (A.1) and (A.2) into (A.3), together with Qt = QNt + Q
S
t , yields (29) and (30).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Following Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), we assume that the Northern household fi-
nances innovative R&D in equilibrium such that LNt a
N
t =
∫ 1
0 v
N
t (j)dj = βw
N
t
∫ 1
0 qt(j)dj = βw
N
t Q
1−ξ
t ,
where the second equality is obtained by using (18). Hence, we have
aNt = βw
N
t Q
1−ξ
t /L
N
t = βw
N
t Φ. (A.4)
Using (49) and (A.4), we can derive cN0 as shown in Lemma 2.
Moreover, the assumption that adaptive R&D is financed by the Southern household in equi-
librium implies aSt = v
S
t /L
S
t and
vSt =
∫
θN
vSt (j)dj =
∫
θN
[
γwSt qt(j)Q
−ξ
t + v
N
t (j)
]
dj
= γwSt Q
−ξ
t
∫
θN
qt(j)dj + βwNt Q
−ξ
t
∫
θN
qt(j)dj =
(
γwSt + βw
N
t
)
Q−ξt Q
N
t ,
(A.5)
where the third equality uses (18) and the last equality uses the definition of QNt in (28). Thus,
we obtain
aSt =
(
γwSt + βw
N
t
) QNt
Qt
Q1−ξt
LNt
LNt
LSt
=
(
γwSt + βw
N
t
) κλNΦ(1− α)
α(κλN + λS)
, (A.6)
where QNt /Qt stems from Lemma 1. Using the relation c
S
t = w
S
t + (ρ− gL)aSt , we obtain cS0 as
shown in Lemma 2.
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Finally, the expression of wS0 is obtained by substituting (9) and (10) into the aggregate price
index such that {∫ 1
0
[pt(j)]1−σdj
} 1
1−σ
= 1
⇔
{∫
θN
[
µNwNt
znt(j)
]1−σ
dj +
∫
θS
[
µSwSt
δznt(j)
]1−σ
dj
} 1
1−σ
= 1
⇔wSt
{(
µNω
)1−σ
QNt +
(
µS/δ
)1−σ
QSt
} 1
1−σ
= 1
⇔wSt = Q
1
σ−1
t
{(
µNω
)1−σ κλN
κλN + λS
+
(
µS/δ
)1−σ λS
κλN + λS
} 1
σ−1
,
(A.7)
where we have used the definitions of QNt and Q
S
t in (28), and Q
N
t /Qt and Q
S
t /Qt from Lemma
1. Then, using Q0 = (ΦLN0 )
1/(1−ξ) yields wS0 as shown in Lemma 2.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
First, we examine the effect of µS on ω. Define the RHS of (54) as
f (µN , µS) ≡ δσ−1
(
µN
µS
)σ
µS − 1
µN − 1.
Differentiating f (µN , µS) with respect to µS yields
∂ f (µS, µN)
∂µS
> 0⇔ δσ−1 (µ
N)σ
(µN − 1)(µS)σ+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[
µS − σ(µS − 1)
]
> 0,
(A.8)
because µS < σ/(σ− 1). Given the LHS of (54) is a decreasing function of ω, an increase in µS
that raises f (µN , µS) leads to a lower ω.
Next, we examine the effect of µN on ω. Similarly, differentiating f (µN , µS) with respect to
µN yields
∂ f (µS, µN)
∂µN
< 0⇔ δσ−1 (µ
S − 1)(µN)σ−1
(µS)σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[
σ(µN − 1)− µN]
(µN − 1)2 < 0, (A.9)
because µN < σ/(σ− 1). Again, considering that the LHS of (54) is a decreasing function of ω,
a decrease in µN that reduces f (µN , µS) leads to a higher ω.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Given the result in Proposition 1 such that ω(µN , µS) is decreasing in µS, it is easy to show
graphically, according to Figure 1, that a rise in µS shifts the Southern steady-state R&D curve
(47) to the right, whereas it has no impact on the Northern steady-state R&D curve (46). Thus,
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both Φ and λS increase in response. According to (40), a permanent higher Φ must be associated
with a temporary increase in the innovation rate λN above its steady-state level λN = gL/(σ− 1).
This completes the proof for Proposition 2.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
First, according to (46) and (47), we can show graphically in Figure 1 that an increase in µN
shifts the North curve to the left and the South curve to the right, leading to an unambiguously
negative effect on λS. This completes the proof for (ii).
As for (i), rewriting λS from (46) to
λS =
βκλNΦ(ρ+ λN)
(µN − 1)(1− βλNΦ) − κλ
N , (A.10)
and substituting it into (47) to solve for Φ yields
Φ =
1
ρ+ λNµN
[
α(ρ+ λN)
(1− α)χ1 +
µN − 1
β
]
, (A.11)
where
χ1 =
(ρ+ λN)(γ+ βω)
µS − 1 + γκλ
N .
Differentiating Φ with respect to µN yields
∂Φ
∂µN
≷ 0
⇔ −λ
N
(ρ+ λNµN)2
{
α(ρ+ λN)
(1− α)χ1 +
µN − 1
β
}
+
1
ρ+ λNµN
{
−α(ρ+ λ
N)
(1− α)χ21
β(ρ+ λN)
µS − 1
∂ω
∂µN
+
1
β
}
≷ 0
⇔− λN
{
α(ρ+ λN)
(1− α)χ1 +
µN − 1
β
}
+ (ρ+ λNµN)
{
1
β
− α(ρ+ λ
N)
(1− α)χ21
β(ρ+ λN)
µS − 1
∂ω
∂µN
}
≷ 0
⇔− αλ
N
(1− α)χ1 +
1
β
− αβ(ρ+ λ
N)(ρ+ λNµN)
(1− α)(µS − 1)χ21
∂ω
∂µN
≷ 0
⇔1− α
α
≷ β
2(ρ+ λN)(ρ+ λNµN)
(µS − 1)χ21
∂ω
∂µN
+
βλN
χ1
,
(A.12)
where we have divided both sides of the third inequality to obtain the fourth inequality. Denote
by α the expression in the RHS of the last inequality. Thus, when α < α (namely α is sufficiently
small), a rise in µN increases Φ permanently, leading to a temporary higher rate of innovation λN
according to (40); otherwise, when α > α (namely α is sufficiently large), a rise in µN decreases
Φ permanently, leading to a temporary lower rate of λN . This completes the proof for (i).
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A.6 Calibration strategy
Given σ, δ, µN , and µS, we obtain γ/β by using (54):
γ
βωσ
+ω1−σ = δσ−1
(
µN
µS
)σ
µS − 1
µN − 1 (A.13)
Given γ/β, we build up three equations to solve the three unknowns, which are κ, λS and Φ.
The three equations are
• US-China relative R&D intensity:
2.117 =
wN0 L
N
r0
wN0 L
N
r0 + c
N
0 L
N
0
wN0 L
N
r0 + c
N
0 L
N
0
wN0 L
N
r0
=
βΦλN
βΦ(ρ− gL + λN) + 1 ·
γ
βλ
S + (ρ− gL)(γβ +ω) + α(κλ
N+λS)
κλNβΦ(1−α)
γ
βλ
S ,
(A.14)
where we have used (50), (51), LNr0 = βλ
NQ1−ξ0 from (33), and L
S
r0 = γλ
SQ1−ξ0 (Q
N
0 /Q0) from
(37) in sequence.
• The Northern-steady-state condition in (46):
λS =
βκλNΦ(ρ+ λN)
(µN − 1)(1− βλNΦ) − κλ
N . (A.15)
• The Southern-steady-state condition in (47):
1 =
ΦλS(1− α)
α(κλN + λS)
{
(ρ+ λN)(γ+ βω)
µS − 1 + γκλ
N
}
(A.16)
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Appendix B
B.1 Alternative specification on R&D
To examine the robustness of our results in the baseline model, in this section we consider
an alternative R&D specification that features fully endogenous growth in the long run. The
main difference in this version of model is the instantaneous probability of innovative and adap-
tive R&D. Specifically, if an R&D entrepreneur employs an amount of Northern labor LNr,t(j) to
perform innovative R&D in industry j, then she succeeds in inventing the next higher quality
product in this industry with an instantaneous probability given by
λNt (j) =
LNr,t(j)
βLNt
. (B.1)
If the Southern affiliate of a Northern leader in industry j employs an amount of Southern labor
LSr,t(j) to conduct adaptive R&D, then the Northern firm succeeds in shifting the production to
the Southern affiliate with an instantaneous probability given by
λSt (j) =
LSr,t(j)
γLSt
. (B.2)
The corresponding zero-expected profit conditions for innovative R&D and adaptive R&D are
respectively,
vNt (j) = βw
N
t L
N
t , (B.3)
and
vSt (j)− vNt (j) = γwSt LSt . (B.4)
In this setup, we now derive the Northern and Southern steady-state conditions and the
steady-state relative wage condition. Using (B.1), the total amount of labor employed for innova-
tive R&D is given by
LNr,t =
∫ 1
0
LNr,t(j)dj = βL
N
t λ
N , (B.5)
Thus, the Northern labor market clearing condition (in per capita term) in (34) now becomes
1 =
κλN
κλN + λS
L¯Nx,t
LNt
+ βλN . (B.6)
Similarly, using (B.2), we show that the amount of labor employed in adaptive R&D is given by
LSr,t =
∫
θN
LSr,t(j)dj = γL
S
t λ
S
(
λN
λN + λS
)
, (B.7)
where (25) is applied. The Southern labor market clearing condition then becomes
1 =
λS
κλN + λS
L¯Fx,t
LSt
+ γλS
(
λN
λN + λS
)
. (B.8)
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Substituting (15) and (42) into (B.3) and making use of symmetry yield the steady-state innovative
R&D condition such that (
µN − 1
) L¯Nx,t
LNt
= β(ρ+ λN). (B.9)
Substituting (15), (16), (42), and (43) into (B.4) gives rise to the following steady-state adaptive
R&D condition: (
µS − 1
) L¯Fx,t
LSt
−
(
µN − 1
) L¯Nx,t
LSt
= γ
(
ρ+ λN
)
. (B.10)
Combining (B.6) with (B.9) yields the Northern steady-state condition given by
1 = βλN
[
κ(ρ+ λN)
(κλN + λS)(µN − 1) + 1
]
. (B.11)
Combining (B.8) with (B.10) yields the Southern steady-state condition given by
1 = λS
{
(ρ+ λN)[γ+ βω(1− α)/α]
(µS − 1)(κλN + λS) +
γλN
λN + λS
}
, (B.12)
where we have applied LNt /L
S
t = (1 − α)/α. Using (B.9), (B.10) and (53), we can show the
steady-state wage condition as follows:
γ
βωσ
+
(1− α)ω1−σ
α
= δσ−1
(
µN
µS
)σ
(µS − 1)(1− α)
α(µN − 1) , (B.13)
which is an implicit function that determines the steady-state equilibrium value of the relative
wage ω(µN , µS). (B.13) also implies that ω is increasing in µN whereas it is decreasing in µS,
which yields the same results as in Proposition 1 under the semi-endogenous setting.36
Next, we derive the steady-state rate of economic growth. Equation (12) shows that the labor
demand for an average-quality product produced by a Northern leader is L¯Nx,t = QtYt
(
µNwNt
)−σ.
Equation (39) implies that the growth rate of quality index is Q˙t/Qt = (κ− 1)λNt . It can be shown
that Y˙t/Yt = C˙t/Ct = c˙Nt /c
N
t + gL by using (5) and c˙
N
t /c
N
t = w˙
N
t /w
N
t = g by using (2). Combining
these conditions yields g = (κ− 1)λN/(σ− 1), where the Northern innovation-arrival rate λN is
implicitly determined by (B.11) - (B.13).
As for social welfare, the steady-state welfare function of the Northern household is the same
as (48). By analogous derivations in Lemma 2, we can show that
aN0 =
vN0
LN0
= βwN0 , (B.14)
aS0 =
vS0
LS0
=
1
LS0
∫
θN
[
vN0 (j) + γw
S
0 L
S
0
]
dj = θNwS0
[
β(1− α)ω
α
+ γ
]
. (B.15)
Thus, the balanced-growth level of consumption per capita for both countries now are, respec-
36Following the proof in the Appendix A.3, it is easy to show the same results for the effects of patent breadth on
the relative wage by differentiating (B.13) with respect to µN and µS.
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tively,
cN0 = w
N
0 [1+ β(ρ− gL)] = ωwS0 [1+ β(ρ− gL)] , (B.16)
and
cS0 = w
S
0
{
1+ θN(ρ− gL)
[
β(1− α)ω
α
+ γ
]}
, (B.17)
where θN is given by (25) and wS0 , which is similarly derived as (52), is given by
wS0 = Q
1
σ−1
0
[(
µNω
)1−σ ( κλN
κλN + λS
)
+
(
µS/δ
)1−σ ( λS
κλN + λS
)] 1
σ−1
. (B.18)
where initial Q0 is normalized to unity.
Given its complexity, this extended model is hereafter solved numerically. The benchmark
parameter values are given by the same set of values in the main text: {ρ, σ, α, µN , µS, κ, z} =
{0.05, 2.9, 0.829, 1.3, 1.25, 2.609, 1.656}. For the remaining parameters {δ,γ, β}, we set δ to 0.0516
to ensure that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and calibrate β and γ by using equations (B.11), (B.12)
and (B.13), with the following moments: the innovation arrival rate (i.e., 12%), the population
growth rate (i.e., 0.5%)37 and the relative wage between China and the US (i.e., 20.101). The cali-
brated parameter values are reported in Table 6. Given these parameter values, the equilibrium
value of λS is 6.285%.
Table 6: Calibrated parameter values in the fully endogenous growth model
ρ σ α µN µS δ κ σ β γ
0.05 2.9 0.829 1.3 1.25 0.0516 2.609 1.656 2.1190 0.0074
Given these calibrated parameter values, we consider the same experiments as in the baseline
model by raising the level of patent breadth in China and the US (i.e., µS and µN) by 1% (percent
change), respectively. The results are reported in Table 7. We find that a permanent increase in
patent breadth µS in China decreases the wage gap ω by 1.043% (percent change), and increases
the innovation arrival rate λN by 1.446% (percent change), the international technology transfer
rate λS by 7.638% (percent change), and the growth rate of consumption g by 0.147% (percentage
point). These changes are similar to those in the semi-endogenous growth model except that the
Northern wage rate is depressed slightly by 0.330%. Moreover, the effects of a rise in µS on both
Southern and Northern social welfare are similar to the counterparts in the semi-endogenous
growth model; a 1% increase in µS leads to a welfare gain (in terms of equivalent variation in
consumption) of 3.347% in China and 2.935% in the US, respectively. Therefore, strengthening
patent protection in China in the fully endogenous growth model also benefits both countries in
terms of welfare, and the benefit to China continues to be more significant than to the US.
Finally, as in the semi-endogenous growth model, the effects of strengthening patent pro-
tection in the US still lead to similar results on the innovation rate, the rate of international
technology transfer and the relative wage in the fully endogenous growth model. Specifically,
37According to http://wdi.worldbank.org/tables, Table 2.2, Labor Force Structure, the growth rate of labor force in
the US during 2007-2016 is 0.5%.
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Table 7: Simulation under the alternative model
∆λN ∆λS ∆ω ∆g ∆ lnωN0 ∆ lnω
S
0 ∆ ln U
N
0 ∆ ln U
S
0
∆µS 1.446% 7.638% -1.043% 0.147% -0.330% 0.718% 2.935% 3.347%
∆µN 4.944% -0.130% 0.716% 0.502% -0.736% -1.450% 10.429% 10.213%
a permanent rise of 1% in patent breadth µN in the US raises the relative wage ω by 0.716%
(percent change), the innovation arrival rate λN by 4.944% (percent change), and the growth rate
of consumption g by 0.502% (percentage point), but it stifles the international technology transfer
rate λS by 0.130% (percent change). In addition, the rise in µN leads to a welfare gain of 10.429%
and 10.213% in the US and China, respectively. Analogous to the welfare effects of strengthening
patent protection in China, strengthening patent protection in the US benefits both countries in
terms of welfare. However, the benefit to China becomes less significant than to the US in this
case.
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